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Introduction
Privacy has become an urgent issue in data use. Traditionally, ‘open government 
data’ has been thought of as free, public data that anyone could use and republish. 
Now, the discussion is shifting to include data that may not be appropriate for 
wide, unfettered access, but can still be of use to non-government communities.1 
Data containing personally identifiable information (PII) cannot be released 
widely, but there are certain circumstances that could allow for its use in 
restricted or de-identified forms. By considering various levels of sensitivity in 
the datasets they manage, data stewards can provide several levels of openness 
and release datasets in different ways accordingly (Open Data Institute n.d.).
As more open government data has become available, data users in business, 
academia, and the non-profit community have come up against a conundrum. 
Many datasets in health, education, housing and other areas may have the 
most value when they are released with ‘microdata’ that can be analysed at the 
level of individual records. But releasing data at that level carries the risk of 
exposing PII that could threaten individuals’ privacy if it were released openly. 
Government agencies must address the risks and sensitivities of making data 
available while at the same time maximising its accessibility and use.
1 Academic observers have been considering how best to balance open data and privacy con-
cerns for several years. More recently, as the concept of open data is becoming accepted at all 
levels of government and the ‘low hanging fruit’ is released, government policy-makers and 
open data advocates have turned their attention to useful data that may be more difficult to 
release for a variety of reasons – including privacy concerns. Examples cited elsewhere in this 
chapter include the Open Data Institute’s Data Spectrum; the Sunlight Foundation’s work on 
‘microdata’, privacy and criminal justice data; and the Center for Open Data Enterprise and 
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy’s Open Data Roundtable Series. 
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Approaches to privacy are inevitably affected by political goals and 
considerations. In the US, for example, President Obama recognised the need 
for clear guidelines by establishing the Federal Privacy Council in February 2016 
(Obama 2016), and the Federal Communications Commission under Obama 
instituted privacy protections for data collected by internet service providers. A 
few months into the Trump Administration, the Republican Congress eliminated 
those FCC protections. It remains to be seen how changing political dynamics in 
the US, and potentially other countries, will affect approaches to privacy policy. 
This chapter presents an analysis that should be helpful to any policy-maker who 
wants to study and address this issue.
Research context
‘Microdata’ is data released in its most granular, unaggregated form (Shaw 2014). 
The key question is: How can we maximise public access to and value from open 
granular information while protecting privacy? To answer this question, data and 
privacy experts have explored issues such as: 
• What are the potential benefits of using unaggregated data (or microdata) 
for the public good?2 
• What are the risks of using these datasets if they contain or could lead to the 
discovery of personally identifiable information, and how can those risks be 
minimised?3 
• What are the best technical, policy and pragmatic approaches to ensure 
strong privacy protections while maximising the benefits of open data?4
Benefits of releasing microdata
Analyses of government-held microdata can advance public policy and social 
benefit through insight into public issues, better informed decision-making and 
improved delivery of public services. Microdata is already being used to improve 
the health and safety of citizens, the national transportation infrastructure, the 
criminal justice system, the quality of education, and the equity and stability 
of the country’s housing market, among other uses. Here are examples of the 
benefits that highly detailed data can support. 
2 See examples from transportation (Center for Open Data Enterprise 2015) and education (Park 
& Shelton 2012).
3 See, for example, Ortellado (2016). 
4 See, for example, Altman et al. (2015); Borgesius et al. (2015); Dwork & Roth (2014); Ohm 
(2010).
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Healthcare
A revolution in healthcare is underway, with data at its core. However, advances 
in this arena are also demonstrating the challenges and risks of greater health 
data utilisation. Health data has long been recognised as especially personal and 
sensitive information: it is already protected by the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and some experts believe that additional 
protections may be necessary (Podesta et al. 2014). 
With proper privacy and security mechanisms in place, health and medical 
research institutions are able to share de-identified patient health information 
with doctors, allowing them to diagnose and treat disease more effectively. 
Large health datasets may be used to target services to underserved populations 
(Federal Trade Commission 2016). Research centers, drug companies, hospitals, 
and other institutions can analyse patient data to improve services and develop 
new treatments (Podesta et al. 2014).
The Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI) exemplifies the opportunities in 
analysing health microdata. Launched in 2015, the PMI is a US federal effort 
to ‘enable a new era of medicine through research, technology, and policies 
that empower patients, researchers, and providers to work together toward 
development of individualised treatments’ (The White House n.d.). If successful, 
it will allow for highly targeted treatments based on a range of inputs including 
personal medical histories and genetic analysis. 
The PMI does not aim to make health data fully open to the public, but it 
relies heavily on data-sharing among clinicians and researchers with appropriate 
restrictions and safeguards. As the White House explains: ‘to get there, we 
need to incorporate many different types of data [… including] data about the 
patient collected by health care providers and the patients themselves. Success 
will require that health data is portable, that it can be easily shared between 
providers, researchers, and most importantly, patients and research participants’ 
(The White House n.d.).
Transportation
Around the world, untold numbers of commuters now check their mobile phones 
every day to see when the next bus will arrive. This information is at their 
fingertips thanks to open data (Press 2010). Ubiquitous travel apps have shown 
how open transportation data can improve public transit access, ease traffic 
congestion, and make citizens’ lives easier.
Transportation microdata has potentially powerful applications when 
combined with other types of microdata. At a 2015 roundtable held with the 
US Department of Transportation and users of its data, participants flagged the 
need for crash data to be combined with hospital data ‘to understand the long-
term impacts of vehicle crashes and how different kinds of safety equipment 
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can mitigate injury’ (Center for Open Data Enterprise 2015). Microdata from 
different sources can also be particularly useful for transit planners. For example, 
microdata on both travel patterns and commuters’ income levels helps planners 
understand the obstacles faced by low income workers as they travel to their jobs, 
allowing for more efficient service delivery and equitable planning decisions 
(Tierney 2012).  
Increasingly popular ‘bike sharing’ systems are another example of using 
transit microdata. These programmes generate mountains of data which are often 
released publicly, allowing advocates to push for expanded service, authorities to 
better target infrastructure investment, and researchers to ask tough questions 
about system equality. For example, a recent analysis of 22 million trips taken 
using New York City’s Citi Bike system revealed that the bikes were heavily used 
for commuting purposes and rides were often concentrated in areas with robust 
bike lane infrastructure (Thomas 2016).
Criminal justice
Microdata can help improve the criminal justice process at several stages. It can 
be used to develop effective public policies, improve community relations, and 
correct unfair practices.
Recent high-profile efforts have focused on opening data about police practices 
and operations (Shaw 2015). The Sunlight Foundation has found that previous 
data releases ‘have already paid off by improving outcomes that communities 
perceived as unfair. The case of released stop-and-frisk data provides an important 
example of this, where New York’s public release of granular pedestrian stop 
data, and the analysis it permitted, led to the discovery that almost 9 out every 
10 people stopped were entirely innocent, and that 9 out of every 10 people 
stopped were non-white’ (The Sunlight Foundation 2014). Stop-and-frisk is a 
controversial practice during which police would stop and search pedestrians 
without a warrant. Allowing for better understanding of this data helped kick-
start the repeal of what proved to be an ineffective and discriminatory policy. 
Housing
Microdata on housing can help identify discriminatory lending patterns, surface 
structural vulnerabilities, and help policy makers prevent a future housing crisis. 
After the global financial crisis, the United States Congress took a number 
of steps to safeguard the country’s financial system. Congress mandated the 
public release of data showing trends in the mortgage industry, in the interest of 
avoiding another housing bubble. As part of that effort, Congress strengthened 
requirements for publishing data under the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HMDA), a 1975 law designed to help prevent housing discrimination 
(Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 2015).
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Data collected under HMDA, which is now implemented by the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), is released publicly every September. 
The data ‘help show whether lenders are serving the housing needs of their 
communities; they give public officials information that helps them make 
decisions and policies; and they shed light on lending patterns that could be 
discriminatory’ (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau n.d.). The CFPB is 
statutorily mandated to publicly disclose data under HMDA while developing 
appropriate protections for borrower privacy in light of HMDA’s purposes. 
Education
Microdata on student performance can help educational institutions provide 
students with the tools and support they need to build useful knowledge and 
skills. Data can be combined with mobile technologies and education software to 
personalise education (Podesta et al. 2014). To this end, the Obama administration 
took a number of steps to ensure that education data is properly leveraged, and 
pledged to ‘work to develop a common trust mechanism for schools that want 
to exchange student data with each other and other qualified parties’ (Park & 
Shelton 2012). So far, however, the difficulty of establishing that trust has been 
an obstacle to working with student data. 
Risks of releasing microdata
The risks of releasing microdata from datasets containing PII are real and well 
documented. There is concern that releasing microdata from these sources could 
result in privacy violations, even if efforts have been made to ‘anonymise’ or ‘de-
identify’ the data by stripping it of PII. 
For many years it was thought that if a database was scrubbed of identifying 
information such as name, address, or social security number that privacy could 
be effectively protected. However, a growing body of research shows that this is 
often not sufficient to guarantee privacy. Furthermore, the increasing influence 
of big data has turned previously non-existent or inconceivable pieces of data into 
potentially identifying ones. There is also no standard definition of PII and wide 
variance in the way that various laws define the concept (Polonetsky et al. 2016). 
The ‘Mosaic Effect’ is a common term for the idea that disparate datasets 
and information can be combined to expose sensitive information and negate 
attempts to protect privacy. Some high-profile examples have fueled these 
concerns. Latanya Sweeney’s work showing that de-identified medical data can 
often be re-identified through linking or matching with other datasets is perhaps 
the most well-known instance (Sweeney 1997). In another well-known example, 
researchers were able to identify individuals from supposedly anonymised 
Netflix rating information a high percentage of the time with only the help of 
publicly available information from another source, the Internet Movie Database 
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(Narayanan & Shmatikov 2008). Another commonly cited example emerged 
when America Online (AOL) released ‘anonymised’ search results from 650 000 
of its users. This turned out to be a case of very weak anonymisation, since AOL 
failed to consider the fact that individuals often perform web searches for their 
own names, rapidly allowing interested individuals to significantly narrow the 
list of potential names (Arrington 2006). While the Netflix and AOL examples 
took place several years ago, they exemplify a continuing concern. 
Privacy concerns go beyond the technical difficulty of anonymising data. In 
a recent paper, Borgesius et al. (2016) highlight ‘three kinds of concerns about 
releasing personal information as open data: (1) the chilling effects on people 
interacting with the public sector, (2) a lack of individual control over personal 
information, and (3) the use of open data for social sorting or discriminatory 
practices’. There is general consensus that there is no foolproof way to completely 
anonymise a dataset, because linking de-identified data to other sources of data can 
often give enough information to identify individuals (O’Hara 2011).
Loss of public trust
The chilling effects detailed by Borgesius et al. (2016) can be tied to a loss of 
public trust. As O’Hara put it, ‘not only are privacy and transparency compatible, 
privacy is a necessary condition for a successful transparency programme’ 
(O’Hara 2011). If individuals in a study don’t trust that their privacy is being 
taken seriously, the programme in question will run into serious problems.5 
Experience shows that it is critically important for the public to feel that privacy 
has been considered in the decision-making process around data release and 
sharing (O’Hara 2011). InBloom was a private data analytics company working 
with educational data from a number of states. The company’s goal was to help 
teachers tailor assignments to better suit the needs of individual students. While 
‘there weren’t any documented cases of InBloom misusing the information’ that 
the company held, InBloom did not demonstrate to the community’s satisfaction 
that the company was taking privacy seriously. There was serious pushback 
from parents and privacy advocates and the company was eventually forced to 
shut down (Kharif 2014). This lesson is applicable to government agencies and 
companies working with sensitive information.
Discriminatory practices
Scassa (2014) explains this risk in more detail as ‘the potential for open government 
data  – even if anonymised – to contribute to the big data environment in which 
citizens and their activities are increasingly monitored and profiled’. In January 
2016, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released a report looking at the 
5  See, for example, Kharif (2014).
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potential for big data to be used for discrimination (Federal Trade Commission 
2016). That report followed a 2014 document released by the White House that 
assessed opportunities and risks associated with big data (Podesta et al. 2016).
Predictive policing has been cited as a data-driven area that has significant 
built-in risks of discrimination. For example, police reports may be used for 
predictive purposes, but neighborhoods with ‘lots of police calls aren’t necessarily 
the same places the most crime is happening. They are, rather, where the most 
police attention is – though where that attention focuses’ is often directed by 
gender and racial biases (Isaac & Dixon 2017).
The 2014 White House report on big data and privacy, released right after 
InBloom announced that it was shutting down, used educational data as an 
example of this concern. ‘As students begin to share information with educational 
institutions,’ the report said, ‘they expect that they are doing so in order to develop 
knowledge and skills, not to have their data used to build extensive profiles about 
their strengths and weaknesses that could be used to their disadvantage in later 
years’ (Podesta et al. 2014).
Current legal and policy frameworks
A number of laws and guidelines provide a framework for ensuring privacy for 
individuals who share information with the government, and for communicating 
about privacy safeguards. Some of the broader legal and policy frameworks 
include the following: 
Freedom of information laws
Freedom of information laws ‘provide inspiration on how to strike a balance 
between privacy and transparency in the open data context [… they] typically 
aim to accommodate privacy interests, for example by reserving access to 
personal information to parties with particular interests, or by only making 
records available in secure reading rooms’ (Borgesius et al. 2016). That said, these 
laws may have narrow privacy restrictions that do not protect against all the risks 
of misusing personal information.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)  
Privacy Guidelines
First published in 1980, the OECD Privacy Guidelines were the first set of 
internationally agreed upon privacy principles (Kuschewsky 2013). They were 
updated and expanded in 2013.  The Framework is widely utilised, but has been 
criticised for its ‘risk-based approach [… as well as] for promoting business over 
privacy’ (Borgesius et al. 2016).
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Privacy impact assessments
US federal law requires government agencies to consider individual privacy 
broadly by requiring them to conduct Privacy Impact Assessments about their 
electronic information systems and data that may contain PII. These assessments 
can be useful when balancing the relative costs and benefits of releasing a dataset 
(Altman et al. 2015). 
Fair Information Practice Principles
The Fair Information Practice Principles are ‘a set of principles and practices that 
describe how an information-based society may approach information handling, 
storage, management, and flows with a view toward maintaining fairness, privacy, 
and security in a rapidly evolving global technology environment’ (Dixon 2008). 
The principles are internationally recognised and were developed over decades 
by a number of international bodies including the US Departments of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, and the OECD (Dixon 2008). These principles have 
been lauded for their ‘balance [between] privacy-related interests and other 
interests, such as those of business and the public sector’ (Borgesius et al. 2016).
Methodology
The Center for Open Data Enterprise used a multimethod approach to identifying 
strategies to best manage data release and privacy protection. This included desk 
research; an Open Data Roundtable with legal, policy and technical experts 
on open data and policy; solicitation of expert feedback; and interviews. The 
sequence of work was as follows: 
(1)  Review of existing literature on data and privacy issues. From this, an 
initial framework for identifying the challneges, solutions, and experts was 
developed.  
(2)   Information collection through an online public survey. Questions assessed:
• Respondents’ evaluation of the key issues in open data and privacy
• Effectiveness of current approaches used to address challenges in 
open data and privacy
• Respondents’ interest in participating in the roundtable
  The survey received 61 responses, which were used to inform the plan for 
the roundtable and preparation of background materials. 
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Legal Policy Technical Total
Academic 1 1 2 4
Company 1 1 6 8
Government 8 14 16 38
Non-profit 2 5 4 11
Total 12 21 28 61
(3)   Preparation of a briefing paper for background to the Open Data Roundtable, 
based on literature review and survey responses.
(4)   An all-day Open Data Roundtable, held on 24 March 2016, to address 
the issue: how to open granular information while protecting privacy. The 
roundtable brought together 75 participants from federal agencies, academia, 
the private sector, and non-profit organisations with technical, policy, and 
legal expertise. This facilitated discussion included presentations, small-
group breakout sessions, reports back to the full group, and synthesis of 
findings by the Center for Open Data Enterprise.
Legal Policy Technical Total
Academic 1 1
Company 2 4 5 11
Government 13 21 13 47
Non-profit 2 11 3 16
Total 17 36 21 75
  Roundtable participants were not asked to develop consensus recommen-
dations but to provide individual observations and suggestions. 
(5)   Additional interviews with roundtable participants to provide additional 
details on existing projects and strategies.
Strategies for managing data release and privacy protection
While many government agencies are concerned about the privacy risk of 
opening data, policy-makers can create programmes and assessment tools that 
reduce these risks to release data for the public good. In developing their open 
data programmes, agencies should consider a range of strategies, and consider 
using them in combination to develop a holistic approach to data management. 
When truly sensitive data is at stake, agencies or cross-agency programmes will 
need to develop thorough, coordinated plans for privacy protection. 
The responses to the survey, and the discussions at the roundtable itself, 
showed the need for a portfolio of strategies in addressing data privacy concerns. 
Some of the issues highlighted in the survey responses included the need to 
balance privacy risks against the public value of opening data; controlled access as 
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a strategy for handling sensitive data; the importance of community engagement; 
education about how data will be used; and building trust in the organisation that 
holds the data.
Participants at the roundtable also stressed the importance of including legal, 
policy, and data experts, as well as stakeholders including industry and civil 
society, to bring different perspectives to bear in devising privacy-protection 
strategies. The ultimate goal, they agreed, is to develop a portfolio of approaches 
for different situations. As one survey respondent put it, ‘One size does not fit all 
use cases. The most appropriate method to protect data privacy and confidentiality 
depends on one’s goals and objectives, risk tolerance, and audience.’ 
It is important to note that there is no one global view on privacy. Different 
areas of the world have different approaches, understandings, legal frameworks, 
and risk tolerances.6 However, many of the strategies discussed in this paper 
should be useful for governments trying to strike a balance between privacy and 
openness, regardless of the local context.
Develop balancing tests
Agencies can balance the risks of releasing data against the potential for public 
good. They can thereby create customised privacy-protection programmes based 
on risk assessment for each type of data involved, recognising and assessing the 
actual risk for releasing a given dataset under different conditions. While the 
exact tradeoffs may be difficult to work out, the use of a ‘balancing test’ can be a 
useful framework for handling the risks and benefits of data release.
This is the approach the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
is planning to use to release data under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA). The CFPB is statutorily mandated to publicly disclose data under the 
HMDA while developing appropriate protections for borrower privacy in light 
of the HMDA’s purposes. Following a recent rulemaking, the CFPB will use 
a balancing test with public input to determine the right balance of serving the 
public good and protecting individual privacy in this data release. The test, which 
has not yet been developed, will be used ‘to determine whether and how HMDA 
data should be modified prior to its disclosure to the public in order to protect 
applicant and borrower privacy while also fulfilling the disclosure purposes of 
the statute’ (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 2014).
Balancing tests have also been explored in the academic literature around 
privacy and open data. Borgesius et al. (2016) propose a ‘balancing framework to 
help public authorities address this question in different contexts. The framework 
takes into account different varying of privacy risks for different types of data. 
It also separates decisions about access and re-use, and highlights a range of 
6 For a better understanding of the different views taken in Europe and the United States, see 
Van der Sloot (2011).
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disclosure routes. A circumstance catalogue lists factors that might be considered 
when assessing whether, under which conditions, and how a dataset can be 
released.’
Customise privacy protection based on risk assessment for each agency 
or programme
Although there are risks to opening data, policy-makers can create programmes 
and assessment tools that reduce these risks. Data-sharing culture should 
recognise and assess the actual risk for releasing a given dataset under different 
conditions. The potential damage from someone breaking the code and learning 
where an individual went to college, for example, is much less than the potential 
harm from revealing that same person’s medical history. For that reason, each 
agency should assess the true risk for every dataset that contains PII and choose 
strategies for managing those datasets accordingly.
When truly sensitive data is at stake, agencies or cross-agency programmes will 
need to develop thorough, coordinated plans for privacy protection. For example, 
the US Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI), which is intended to help patients 
personalise their health care, has developed a framework for protecting privacy 
without inhibiting this scientific work. The PMI is part of a new approach to 
disease treatment and prevention that ‘takes into account individual variability in 
genes, environment, and lifestyle for each person’. The success of the PMI – and 
precision medicine more broadly – will require researchers, providers and patients 
to ‘work together to develop individualised care’ and will rely heavily on patient 
participation (National Institutes of Health n.d.). The PMI Privacy and Trust 
Principles ‘articulate a set of core values and responsible strategies for sustaining 
public trust and maximising the benefits of precision medicine’. Developed by 
an inter-agency working group with expert consultation, they are broken down 
into six key areas: governance, transparency, respecting participant preferences, 
participant empowerment through access to information, data sharing, access, 
use, and data quality and integrity (The White House 2015).
Data governance in each agency should also consider a range of possible 
conditions and risks. Governance approaches make a distinction between 
‘good actors’ and ‘bad actors’. When data is released to good actors, such as 
qualified researchers, re-identification risk can be limited through agreements on 
conditions of data use. These kinds of agreements can provide a ‘trust framework’ 
to govern the use of data effectively. At the same time, trust frameworks are 
useless against ‘bad actors’ who want to breach privacy protections on purpose. 
Agencies may want to use ‘threat modeling’ to identify worst-case scenarios 
and decide what measures they need to prevent them. Threat modeling is 
a concept applied to network security, where it involves identifying system 
objectives, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures to prevent or reduce the impact 
of potential threats to the system. The same concept can be applied to privacy 
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issues by developing scenarios where bad actors might try to break through 
security safeguards to identify individuals in a database, and planning effective 
preventive measures.
Apply differential access
It may be necessary to consider gradations of openness under different circum-
stances. For example, some kinds of data could be made ‘open’ only for sharing 
between federal agencies under certain conditions, or sharing only with qualified 
and vetted researchers, rather than opening it to the public at large. Approaches 
include:
• Inter-agency transfer of data that is controlled and kept securely between the 
two agencies involved. 
• Federated model using a cloud repository and limiting access to trusted 
users. This model requires a secure way to upload data as well as secure ways 
to share it.
• Tiered access data-sharing programmes to allow levels of access to multiple 
types of users.
• Opt-in and permission-based mechanisms that enable individuals to make 
their data more widely available if they choose to. For example, individual 
patients have an incentive to share data about their condition in the hope 
that it will be used to find better treatments.
One of the first priorities of the Precision Medicine Initiative was a set of 
Privacy and Trust Principles that ‘articulate a set of core values and responsible 
strategies for sustaining public trust and maximising the benefits of precision 
medicine’. They aim to ensure transparency, strong governance, and data quality 
while empowering patients and protecting privacy (The White House 2014). 
The principles for data sharing, access, and use, for example, include using 
methods to preserve the privacy of patients’ records, prohibiting unauthorised re-
identification of patients, and establishing multiple tiers of data access, from open 
to controlled, depending on the nature of the data. Overall, the Privacy and Trust 
Principles outline a strong framework for applying many current approaches to 
balancing data sharing with privacy. 
Employ de-identification technologies
It seems to be impossible to create a method of de-identification that removes all 
the privacy risks of PII from public datasets while also retaining the full value 
of the data for analysis.7 However, it may be possible to provide a secure level of 
7 For a comprehensive look at the inability of anonymisation to function as a prescription for 
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de-identification if researchers can accept a loss of some detail and granularity in 
the resulting dataset. Approaches to de-identification include:
• Identifying individuals with unique ID numbers that make it possible to 
connect data about them in different datasets without revealing their identity. 
• Dropping non-critical information to make re-identification more difficult. 
For example, one regular practice is to drop the last three digits of an 
individual’s zip code. 
• Using differential privacy and synthetic data. Differential privacy applies 
algorithmic research to the problem of data privacy. At its best, it ‘can 
make confidential data widely available for accurate data analysis’. Over 
time, however, this method can also become vulnerable to re-identification. 
Therefore, ‘the goal of algorithmic research on differential privacy is 
to postpone this inevitability as long as possible’ (Dwork & Roth 2014). 
Synthetic data relies on ‘a complex statistical model that generates a 
simulated population that has the same general features as the original data’. 
While it has several existing applications, there is no consensus on its broad 
usefulness (Callier 2015). These are both sophisticated tools that require 
resources and data science expertise to apply. 
The technical challenge of de-identifying data is becoming increasingly complex. 
De-identification technology is difficult to apply to the range of data now 
available, including geospatial, medical and genomic, body-camera and other 
data. Finally, even if it is possible to de-identify data today, it could become 
possible to re-identify individuals as technology evolves in the future. If de-
identification or related strategies are being used as part of a broader privacy 
protection strategy, ‘The decision of how or if to de-identify data should thus be 
made in conjunction with decisions of how the de-identified data will be used, 
shared or released’ (Garfinkel 2015).
Enhance data governance structures
New data governance structures can help manage privacy concerns. In the 
US, many agencies now handle privacy issues through a chief privacy officer, a 
disclosure review board, or other offices and organisational structures. To make 
privacy protection as effective as possible, governance structures and safeguards 
need to be integrated and aligned with goals for data release. Options include:
  
• Identifying a single agency leader (for example, a chief data officer) to 
centralise each agency’s management of open government data and address 
privacy concerns. 
privacy concerns, see Ohm (2010).
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• Develop core sets of policies and procedures that can be customised for each 
agency. 
• Create model infrastructure – a virtual central data hub where access to data 
and APIs is managed by a common set of metadata (security, definitional, 
sharing licences) and user agreements. 
Build trust with the community
Individual privacy should be treated in the context of public good. Many datasets 
that include PII also include information that can have great public benefit. In 
these cases, it will be essential to craft approaches to privacy protection that 
respect individuals’ rights while also making data available to the public, or to 
selected researchers, in a way that supports social and scientific goals.
It is also essential to communicate the goals of open data, and privacy 
safeguards for the data, to the community and individuals that have provided it. 
Individuals are understandably concerned that data about their health, education, 
employment, financial status, or other sensitive data should not be exposed or 
misused. Agencies and others that plan to use the data with appropriate privacy 
protections will need to be sure that the communities involved understand and 
are satisfied with their approach. 
One successful example from the U.S. has been the Police Data Initiative 
(PDI), launched in May 2015 with an initial group of 21 police departments 
from across the country, along with a range of partners. Through the PDI, police 
departments are working with data and technology partners to overcome technical 
and other hurdles and improve data sharing and analysis. Working with police 
data poses challenges to security and privacy, including concerns about releasing 
data on potential perpetrators, victims, and individual officers’ actions. Several 
police departments have taken this challenge as an opportunity to work with 
the community to find solutions together. For example, ‘the New Orleans Police 
Department...previewed policing datasets with a group of young coders and their 
tech mentors [and] the Orlando Police Department worked with sexual assault 
and domestic violence victim advocates to figure out how to balance transparency 
with victim privacy’. By taking this kind of approach, a number of ‘communities 
and police departments [are] using data as a way to engage in dialogue and build 
trust’ (Wardell & Ross 2016).
Conclusion
There is no single, foolproof solution to the challenge of protecting privacy when 
open data is released. However, a combination of strategies can make it possible 
to tap the value of granular, detailed data while managing privacy risks. While 
some strategies involve technical approaches, others are based on policy, data 
governance, community outreach and communication. These strategies should 
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be applicable not only in the US, where this research was based, but in other 
countries and contexts around the world. 
As technology and policy around privacy evolve, more research will help open 
data programmes optimise their strategies for privacy protection. Researchers 
may choose to focus on the potential and limits of different technical approaches; 
the conditions for success of different privacy-protection strategies; protocols 
for releasing data with different ‘degrees of openness’; cultural and social 
expectations of privacy in different communities; or other topics that help to 
develop a multifaceted approach to privacy protection in the context of open data. 
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